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ALLOWING THE FACTORY SHUTDOWN:
PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND ITS JUSTIFICATION
ELLEN KELLY*
Effective economic policies which would encourage the
progressive development of American industries are essential
to the United States economy. These policies, however, must
be accompanied by additional legislative efforts that will af-
ford assistance to those victimized by the development pro-
cess. Among the needed legislative changes are those which
would regulate the process of plant closings1 and compensate
workers and communities for economic losses caused by clos-
ings. Such legislation has been enacted in a few states' and
has been proposed in many more. National legislation has
been presented to Congress in several forms but never
passed.'
This article proposes national legislation intended to mit-
igate the effects of a plant closing. The intent of the legisla-
tion is to require corporations to account for their business
decisions: to treat shutdown costs as they treat start-up
costs-as a cost of doing business. It would provide a mini-
mum mechanism to protect workers and communities by re-
quiring a business anticipating a shutdown to provide ad-
vance notice and severance payments to the affected workers
and community.
A thorough examination of the social and economic im-
pact of plant shutdowns and the current controls on plant
closings reveals the necessity of the proposed national plant
closing legislation. Part I of this article examines the effects
of plant closings on the workers, communities and local insti-
tutions, and identifies the various costs associated with a cor-
poration's decision to close a plant. Part II discusses the role
of the corporation and illustrates how the requirements of
the proposed legislation conform with the corporate func-
tion. In Part III, other alternatives to national legislation are
* B.S.B.A. 1983, Georgetown University; J.D. 1986, University of
Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1984-1986.
1. For purposes of this article, plant shutdowns include partial clos-
ings and relocations.
2. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
evaluated. And finally, Part IV demonstrates how this propo-
sal achieves an equitable balance between the needs and val-
ues of society and the economic prosperity of the
corporation.
I. THE EFFECTS OF PLANT CLOSINGS
The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States De-
partment of Labor reported that 11.5 million workers,
twenty years of age and over, lost their jobs due to plant
shutdowns between January of 1979 and January of 1984.4
Of those workers who had been at their jobs for at least
three years prior to the shutdown (5.1 million), 60% (3.1 mil-
lion) were reemployed when surveyed in January of 1984,
25% (1.3 million) were looking for work, and the rest
(700,000) had left the labor force.' Forty-five percent of
those who were reemployed received lower pay.
Furthermore, of the 5.1 million workers who had been
at their jobs for at least three years, nearly half had been dis-
placed from jobs in the manufacturing sector. From an occu-
pational standpoint, operators, fabricators, and laborers fig-
ured most prominently among the workers who had been
displaced from jobs. According to the Bureau, the higher the
skill of the displaced worker, the more likely he was to be
reemployed when surveyed. Approximately 75% of workers
displaced from managerial and professional jobs were reem-
ployed. In contrast, less than one-half of those who had jobs
as handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers were
reemployed. 6
A study conducted by the Brookings Institution7 further
4. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT ON
DISPLACED WORKERS (1984) [hereinafter cited as DISPLACED WORKERS].
5. Id. at 1. The Bureau limited the study to those with at least
three years of tenure on the jobs they lost so as to focus only on workers
who had developed a firm attachment to their job. If a two year cutoff was
used, the number of displaced workers would have increased to 6.9 million.
A five year cutoff would have lowered the total to 3.2 million. Flaim &
Sehgal, Displaced Workers of 1979-83: How Well did they Fare?, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., June 1985, at 3, 5.
6. DISPLACED WORKERS, supra note 4, at 2-3.
7. C. HARRIS, THE MAGNITUDE OF JOB Loss FROM PLANT CLOSINGS
AND THE GENERATION OF REPLACEMENT JOBS: SOME RECENT EVIDENCE (1984).
Harris' study estimated 16 million jobs lost between 1976-1982 due to
plant closings; almost one-third of these were in the manufacturing sector.
In the 1980-1982 period, rates of employment loss due to closings of large
manufacturing firms (more than 100 employees) doubled that reported in
the previous two years. During this same period large firms in the manufac-
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demonstrates the mismatch between the skills of the dis-
placed worker and the requirements of new employment op-
portunities. According to this study, between 1976 and 1980
high technology manufacturing industries accounted for ap-
proximately 42% of the net growth in manufacturing em-
ployment and 26% of the employment gains from new manu-
facturing businesses.8 This shift to more technically advanced
industry complicates the process of job replacement in the
manufacturing sector. Additionally, demographic characteris-
tics of the high technology production workers suggest that
new jobs created in these industries may not absorb the blue-
collar production workers displaced by declining manufactur-
ing industries.'
The inequities in the regional distribution of business
closings and business formations ° and the mismatch between
displaced workers and new employment opportunities com-
bine to create adjustment problems for the workers. Al-
though attempts to halt or reverse the reindustrialization of
the manufacturing sector may be neither feasible nor desira-
ble, the proposed plant closing legislation provides an ade-
quate remedy.
Loss of employment and financial security, however, is
not the only consequence of a plant closing. Also important
are the relationships workers have established as a result of
working for a company. In many cases, the worker has made
a total commitment to the community and the company: He
has moved his residence, enrolled his children in school, and
has involved himself in the civic affairs of the community.
This commitment benefits not only the worker and his fam-
ily, but also his employer. It "enhances the worker's ability to
do his job, encourages loyalty to the company, [and] facili-
turing sector managed to replace only two of every ten jobs lost in plant
closings. Id. at 9, 10, 17.
8. Id. at 16.
9. Id. at 17. The Brookings Institution study reported that in two
of the fastest growing high technology industries, 35 % of the employees in
the electronic computing equipment industry and 40% in the communica-
tion equipment industry are women. In contrast, in the steel and automo-
bile industries, women account for less than 15%.
10. According to the study conducted by the Brookings Institution,
displaced manufacturing workers are concentrated in the North which has
low business formation and job replacement rates. Id. at 18. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics reported that the large number of workers who have been
displaced from their jobs in the East, North Central, and the Middle Atlan-
tic states are less likely than those in other areas to be reemployed. Dis-
PLACED WORKERS, supra note 4, at 3.
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tates the employee's continuing process in learning to do his
job effectively." 1
Plant shutdowns may also affect the physical and mental
health of the displaced workers.12 Research indicates that dis-
placed workers suffer increased blood pressure, abnormally
high cholesterol and blood sugar levels, and higher inci-
dences of heart attacks, ulcers, respiratory diseases, and
hyperallergic reactions.'3 These problems are compounded
by the loss of health benefits which usually accompanies the
loss of a job for an American worker; fewer than one-third
typically have any health insurance. 4 Moreover, studies indi-
cate that the incidence of suicide among workers displaced by
plant closings is thirty times the national average. 6 The mag-
nitude of physical and mental problems that result from job
losses are only now being assessed. Thus, to simply measure
the impact of plant closings upon the workers in terms of un-
employment and lost wages may seriously underestimate the
total harm the worker and his family may suffer.
The impact of a plant closing, however, is not limited to
the worker and his family; the community itself suffers as the
effects of the shutdown "ripple through the economy.''1
When a corporation establishes a plant in the community, its
presence affects the community in a variety of ways. The
community may have to construct more schools and larger
water and sewerage facilities, increase personnel and
purchase more equipment for police and fire departments,
and adjust traffic patterns to accommodate workers commut-
ing to the plant. These efforts, however, are not without re-
11. Kavanagh, Ethical Issues in Plant Relocation, Bus. & PROF. ETHICS
J., Winter 1982, at 21, 22-36.
12. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF
AMERICA PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT, AND THE DISMAN-
TLING OF BASIC INDUSTRY 65 (1982).
13. Id. at 33; Ford, Plant Closing Legislation, 1983 DET. C.L. REV.
1233.
14. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 12, at 33. In Europe,
most unemployed workers are covered by universal health plans.
15. Baker, There is a Better Way, 32 LAB. L.J. 453, 455 (1981). Dr.
Harvey Brenner of John Hopkins University found that in 1949-73, unem-
ployment played a major role in several forms of "social trauma." He con-
cluded that a 1% increase in the unemployment rate over a period of six
years has been associated with: 37,000 total deaths (including 20,000 car-
diovascular deaths), 920 suicides, 650 homicides, 500 deaths from cirrhosis
of the liver, 4,000 state mental hospital admissions, and 3,300 state prison
admissions. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 12, at 65.
16. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 12, at 67.
[Vol. 2
FACTORY SHUTDOWNS
ward since such local institutions, schools, businesses, and
agencies prosper as a result of that company's presence. 7
But when the company closes, shocks reverberate
throughout the community. Local businesses dependent upon
the company or its employees are faced with bankruptcy.
These bankruptcies, in turn, may lead to layoffs in other in-
dustries as suppliers lose contracts and retail stores lose cus-
tomers.18 Moreover, the community and the taxpayers are
left with more employees and infrastructure than they need,
with cost burdens far outweighing revenue.19  These
problems, in turn, lead to increased demands for public assis-
tance, and just when social services are most needed, payroll,
property, and income tax revenue losses undermine the abil-
ity of local government to respond. 0 Consequently, what be-
gins as a "behind-closed-doors company decision" to close a
particular production facility ends up affecting the entire
community. By the time all of these "ripple effects" spread
throughout the local economy, workers and families far re-
moved from the closed plant can be affected, often with dra-
matic consequences.2
Finally, plant closings clearly take a toll on the unions. A
widespread shutdown not only weakens organized labor, as
union members who lose their jobs go elsewhere to nonunion
jobs, but may also weaken the union's ability to organize and
bargain with other companies in the same community.2 Un-
17. Kavanagh, supra note 11, at 24.
18. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 12, at 33.
19. Kavanagh, supra note 11, at 23.
20. Ford, supra note 13, at 1222. In the fall of 1977, the Lykes Cor-
poration closed its steel mills in Youngstown, Ohio, thus placing 4,500
steelworkers in the unemployment lines. Studies estimated that in the first
39 months following the shutdown, the communities around Youngstown
would lose $8 million in taxes, the county would lose another $1 million,
and the state would lose up to $8 million. Property taxes in Campbell (the
actual location of the plant) were increased more than 25% in one year,
and schools faced a substantial deficit. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH
CENTER, INC., PROXY ISSUES REPORT: PLANT CLOSINGS; at E-I 1, E-12 (March
20, 1984) Ihereinafter cited as PROXY ISSUES REPORT].
In 1982, unemployment in the area was 23%, as compared with a na-
tional average of 9.7%. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LA-
BOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 156 (1984). In addition, the crisis inter-
vention center in the valley reported receiving 7,800 calls for help in two
months, including reports of wife beatings, alcoholism, child abuse, and su-
icide threats. PROXY ISSUES REPORT, supra note 20, at E-12.
21. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 12, at 67.
22. Carroll, Managing Public Affairs When Business Closes Down: Social
Responsibility and Management Actions, CALIF. MGMT. REV., Winter 1984, at
19851
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ions also contend that large conglomerates are able to use the
increasing mobility of capital to undermine the strength and
breadth of unions by using the threat of a plant closing to
extract concessions from them. 3
II. THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE CORPORATION
The proposed legislation requires that a corporation
planning a shutdown provide advance notice and severance
pay to the affected workers and community. Before assessing
the specific provisions required by this legislation, however, it
is first necessary to establish whether these obligations im-
posed on a corporation fall within the parameters of the cor-
porate role.24 Secondly, once it is demonstrated that the obli-
gations exist, the mode by which the obligations are imposed
(in this case, government intervention), must be justified.
A. The Laissez-Faire Framework
The traditional role of business encompasses two essen-
tial elements: (i) the production of goods and services (ii)
done with the intention of making a profit. 5 It is problem-
atic, however, to evaluate the corporation's obligations in ful-
filling this role.
Advocates of laissez-faire capitalism define a corpora-
tion's duty as the maximization of profits for shareholders.26
As Milton Friedman asserts, a corporation has but one func-
tion: "to make as much money as possible while conforming
to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law
and those embodied in ethical customs. '27 For Friedman,
125, 128.
23. Id.
[General Motors] began a concerted effort to circumvent the
union's strength by locating new plants in what are primarily
right-to-work states .... [Bietween 1975-1980, GM opened a to-
tal of 14 new plants, with eight located in the deep South and one
in Mexico. Nine of the U.S. plants were situated in right-to-work
states. This permitted GM to effectively use the threat of shifting
production to its non-union shops as a bargaining lever in its
union negotiations.
PROXY IssuEs REPORT, supra note 20, at E-12.
24. N. BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS 18 (1982).
25. Camenisch, Business Ethics: On Getting to the Heart of the Matter in
BUSINESS, RELIGION, AND ETHICS 195, 198 (D. Jones ed. 1982).
26. N. BOWIE, supra note 24, at 18.
27. M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1970, Magazine, at 33, reprinted in ETHICAL
[Vol. 2
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"ethical customs" mean the honesty and integrity required
for the market mechanism to function. 28 These customs do
not include incorporating human and social values into eco-
nomic decision-making. 29 In fact, as Friedman concludes, a
corporation has only one social responsibility: "to use its re-
sources and engage in activities designed to increase its prof-
its so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to
say, engage in open and free competition, without deception
or fraud."30
This principle of laissez-faire 1 and its built-in profit mo-
tive remain deeply entrenched in our economic framework. 2
From Adam Smith's "invisible hand"3 to today, many econo-
mists have contended that the best way to overcome scarcity
and maximize personal freedom is to rely on the "individual's
pursuit of self interest in a private property system regulated
by the force of market competition, in which the government




Today, however, it is no longer feasible to depend on the
utilitarian convergence of business interest and social values A
la Smith's "invisible hand."3 5 Although at one time society
may have accepted the market mechanism as the key to relat-
IssuEs IN BUSINESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 191-97 (1979).
28. THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN VISION AND THE MODERN CORPORATION
250 (0. Williams & J. Houck eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as THE JUDEO-
CHRISTIAN VISION].
29. M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business, in ETHICAL
THEORY AND BUSINESS 81 (1983).
30. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
31. Strict laissez-faire capitalism is the doctrine that the self-regulat-
ing market economy should operate with only minimal government inter-
ference. Such an extreme capitalist position is widely regarded as obsolete
today. Wogaman, The Case for Laissez Faire Capitalism: A Protestant View-
point, in BUSINESS, RELIGION, AND ETHICS, supra note 25, at 99.
32. Id. at 106.
33. According to Adam Smith, a man strives toward selfish gain but
while doing so is led by an "unseen hand" to contribute toward the com-
mon good. "By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have
never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the pub-
lic good." A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (E. Cannan ed. 1937).
34. Wilber & Jameson, Goals of a Christian Economy and the Future of
the Corporation, in THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN VISION, supra note 28, at 203, 205.
35. THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN VISION, supra note 28, at 251.
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ing managerial obligations to human welfare, that general
consensus has shifted. Pollution control illustrates this shift.
Prior to the mid-1960's, pollution was a noncontroversial, if
not irrelevant issue; increase in production without regard
for externalities took priority. 6 But once society gained a
certain level of wealth, pollution became a focal issue in pub-
lic debate, one demanding solutions. Such public reaction
demonstrates a continual redefining of a corporation's re-
sponsibilities and reflects the shift of the general moral con-
sensus. 7 In view of this evolution, it would be naive to sug-
gest that business remains a self-contained and self-sufficient
entity which can define its own goals and functions indepen-
dently of the society's goals and needs.3 Indeed, for the past
decade, it has become popular for corporations to espouse a
socially responsible philosophy. 9 The recurring theme of re-
ports on corporate social responsibility is that a business, as a
social institution, must "take into account" both the eco-
nomic and social needs of the society in which it functions.40
36. R. BENNE, THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM: A MORAL RE-
ASSESSMENT 192 (1982).
37. A. BUONO & L. NICHOLS, CORPORATE POLICY, VALUES AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 1-29 (1985); J. HARGREAVES & J. DAUMAN, BUSINESS SUR-
VIVAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE, at xiii-xv, 1-14 (1975). See generally R. ACKERMAN,
THE SOCIAL CHALLENGE TO BUSINESS (1975); J. FENDROCK, MANAGING IN
TIME OF RADICAL CHANGE (1971).
38. Those who argue that business should be permitted to define its
own goals and purposes, independently of societal interests, and thus allow
businesses unilateral and arbitrary control over plant closings must recon-
cile why business should be granted a latitude that is denied to other major
sectors of society, i.e., the political, educational, legal, medical. Such a posi-
tion cannot be defended by a distinction between the public and private
sector because much of education and the legal and medical professions are
not confined to the public sector. Camenisch, supra note 25, at 195, 204.
39. Gatewood & Carroll, The Anatomy of Corporate Social Response:
The Rely, Firestone 500, and Pinto Cases, 24 Bus. HORIZONS 9 (1981). See also
ERNST & ERNST, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCLOSURE, 1978 SURVEY (1978).
40. Company management must consistently demonstrate a su-
perior talent for keeping profit and growth objectives as first pri-
orities. However, it also must have enough breadth to recognize
that enlightened self-interest requires the company to fill any rea-
sonable expectation placed upon it by the community and the vari-
ous concerned publics. Keeping priorities straight and maintaining
the sense of civic responsibility will achieve important secondary
objectives of the firm. Profitability and growth go hand in hand
with fair treatment of employees, of direct customers, of consum-
ers, and of the community.
E. Harness, Views on Corporate Responsibility, quoted in Gatewood & Carroll,
supra note 39, at 9 (at which time Mr. Harness was serving as Chairman of
the Board for Proctor & Gamble).
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Due to the changing perceptions - of both the public and
the corporate entity - on the matter of corporate responsi-
bility, it is reasonable to expect a business to incorporate into
its decision-making process the obligation to mitigate the im-
pact of a plant shutdown upon the workers and community.
Undoubtedly, advocates of laissez-faire capitalism, such
as Milton Friedman, would reject the idea that a corporation
facing a shutdown should provide advance notice and sever-
ance pay as part of its social responsibilities. But even admit-
ting for the sake of argument that the idea of corporate so-
cial responsibility is nonsensical, it is possible that the
proposed obligations still bind. For example, no one would
maintain that a corporation has no obligation to pay its debts,
even if its "exclusive" duty is only to make as much money as
possible."1 The obligation of a corporation, as defined by
Milton Friedman, explicitly admits an obligation to "stay
within the rules of the game." These "rules" comprise not
only specific positive laws but also the moral constraints that
constitute an "implied contract with society."' 2 One condi-
tion of this "implied contract" is the obligation of property
owners to use their property in a way consistent with society's
welfare."
C. The Obligations of Property Owners
Clearly, in our system, the recognized legal owners of a
factory are the shareholders." They have invested their
money and incurred risks with the expectation of profit. It
would follow, then, that as legal property owners, the share-
holders have the right to dictate the manner in which their
investment is utilized, namely to maximize profits."5
Ownership, however, is not and never has been con-
strued as an "absolute" right in the owned property."6 Irre-
41. Kavanagh, Ethical Issues in Plant Relocation, in ETHICAL THEORY
AND BUSINESS, supra note 29, at 106, 112.
42. Bowie, Changing the Rules, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS,
supra note 29, at 103-06. See also MANAGING THE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATION 3-5 (M. Anshen ed. 1974).
43. Id.
44. In this article, it is assumed that the shareholders, as owners of
the factories, dictate the management of their property by their election of
the Board of Directors, whom in turn, appoint the management.
45. Kavanagh, supra note 11, at 28-29. See also N. BowlE, supra note
24, at 21.
46. N. BOWIE, supra note 24, at 21; Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 144 (A. Guest ed. 1961). Ownership rights
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spective of the importance of private property in a capitalist
economy, property owners (in this case, shareholders) do not
possess an absolute right to do what they want with their
property.47 One of the implicit moral rules in any use of
property is the obligation captured in the legal maxim sic
utere: "use that which is yours in such a way that you do not
injure another. ' 48 Thus, even if the only explicit obligation
of a corporation is to make a profit, it cannot avoid the im-
plicit obligation to avoid harm to others in the use of its
property and to account for any injury its actions cause, how-
ever unintentional.49 As demonstrated in Part I of this arti-
cle, a company which has solidly established itself in the com-
munity would clearly injure others if it decided to terminate
or relocate its business. Although the company may not in-
to property have traditionally been subject to the legitimate claims of
others as illustrated by the prohibition of harmful uses of one's property,
and the liability of property to execution of a debt, taxation, or expropria-
tion by the public authority. Id. at 144-45.
47. In refuting an absolute property right in owners, Bowie distin-
guishes three premises: first, that businesses should be privately owned; sec-
ond, that business decisions usually should be private; and third, that busi-
ness owners can do whatever they want with their property. Bowie finds
the first and second premises morally acceptable, but he finds the third
premise morally objectionable because it is grounded in a principle of abso-
lute ownership. N. BowlE, supra note 24, at 21.
48. Kavanagh, supra note 11, at 25. That property not be used to
harm another is a principle underlying the Millean labor theory (the use of
property that represents a loss to someone other than the owner is not
justified) and utility theories (prohibiting property uses which have a net
disutility). L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 111
(1977). Honore developed 10 "standard incidents of ownership" necessary
to the "concept of ownership." These encompass: the right to possess, the
right to manage, the right to use, the right to the capital, the right to the
income of the thing, the right to security, the right of transmissibility and
absence of term, the prohibition of harmful use, and liability to execution.
Honore, supra note 46, at 112-24. As to the prohibition of harmful use,
Honore states:
An owner's liberty to use and manage the thing owned as he
chooses is in mature systems of law, as in primitive systems, subject
to the condition that uses harmful to other members of society are
forbidden ....
I may use my car freely but not in order to run my neighbour
down, or to demolish his gate. . . .These and similar limitations
on the use of things are so familiar and so obviously essential to
the existence of an orderly community that they are not often
thought of as incidents of ownership; yet, without them "owner-
ship" would be a destructive force.
Id. at 123.
49. Kavanagh, supra note 41, at 113.
[Vol. 2
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tend harm, but may only desire to capitalize on more efficient
means of production, it nonetheless disrupts a dependency
between itself and its community and workers. To close shop,
without accounting for the resulting harm, clearly falls be-
yond the morally permissible obligations of ownership.
Therefore, the traditional notion of sic utere should properly
be interpreted to include the harm caused by plant
shutdowns.
D. Fairness
Ownership and the use of one's property (in this case the
right of a factory owner to shut down a factory without tak-
ing mitigating action) is also constrained by fundamental no-
tions of fairness. The general idea of fairness is that anyone
who chooses to involve himself in a cooperative activity must
do his share and is entitled to expect the same of others in-
volved in the activity. 50 A company which closes a plant and
disregards the effects of its action is behaving unfairly toward
its employees and the community.5"
In an employer-employee relationship, there is a reasona-
bly just cooperative arrangement between the parties as to
the conditions of the job; the primary quid pro quo is the em-
ployer's fair day's pay for the employee's fair day's work.
Both parties, however, also have legitimate expectations
which are not expressed in the quid pro quo relationship. The
employer expects the worker to make a commitment to his
job which entails not only loyalty to the company but a con-
tinuing process in learning to perform his job effectively.
And no one would question that a safe workplace is within
the worker's legitimate expectation.5 2 Arguably, basic notions
of fairness suggest that if a corporation expects a commit-
ment from the workers, and indeed benefits from such com-
mitment, 53 it is reasonable for the worker to expect that the
company will not suddenly shut down and "pack its bags"
without at least providing advance notice and severance pay
to those affected.
E. Externalities
That a company planning a shutdown is not free to ig-
50. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE 343 (1971).
51. Kavanagh, supra note 41, at 111.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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nore the consequences (the social costs) of its action is also
supported by an analysis of externality costs: "By locating and
operating a manufacturing plant (or a similar job-creating op-
eration) in a community, a company produces certain exter-
nalities, affecting both the workers and the community,
which are pertinent to the relocation issue. ' 5 4 The term "ex-
ternalities" refers to the unintended side effects which a busi-
ness produces along with its intended product."5 But not for
the existence of the business, the side effects would not exist.
Many of these externalities (by-products) of the business re-
present costs borne by society although they are produced by
businesses."6 Unless businesses are held accountable for such
costs of operating, however unintended the costs may be, a
distorted view of the benefits of the competitive business en-
terprise results.
When a corporation locates an operation in a commu-
nity, its intention is simply to manufacture and distribute its
product. In so doing, however, it produces various unin-
tended but clearly foreseeable results which seriously affect
the workers and community in which the company operates.
As outlined in Part I of this article, many workers change
their lifestyles because of their employment relationship; like-
wise, the community changes to better support the company.
When a major plant discontinues operations, however, an un-
intended situation arises: the community experiences high
unemployment and must support an overbuilt infrastructure
with an inadequate financial base.5" The company did not in-
tend such a result. Nevertheless, the company caused it.
Whether intended or not, these costs are in fact produced by
the company in the close-down phase of its business. When a
business fails to internalize these externality costs, the market
is distorted as the commodities produced are sold at a cost
less than their marginal social cost. This represents a diver-
gence between private and social accounting that the market
54. Kavanagh, supra note 11, at 23.
55. Id. Note that externalities can be either good or bad.
56. N. BowIE, supra note 24, at 23. Common examples include air
and water pollution, excessive noise, and unattractive factories. Environ-
mentalists have successfully urged businesses to internalize these externali-
ties by considering them as real although unintended products and incor-
porating them into the accounting system. Congress has also passed
legislation requiring corporations to account for such costs, e.g., pollution
controls. Kavanagh, supra note 11, at 24, 31.
57. Kavanagh, supra note 11, at 24.
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fails to register. 8 Plant closing legislation would provide the
necessary corrections to the market by requiring businesses
to recognize the costs of a plant shutdown, just as they ac-
count for the costs of a plant start-up.
Thus far, this article has supported the thesis that based
upon principles of moral consensus, obligations of property
owners, fundamental fairness, and an economic theory of ex-
ternalities, it is within a corporation's realm of obligations to
provide advance notice and severance pay to the workers and
community affected by a plant shutdown. The following sec-
tion of this article will justify intervention by the federal gov-
ernment as a means of imposing these duties on the
corporation.
III. THE CASE FOR FEDERAL REGULATION
The proposed national legislation would provide workers
and the community with a right to be informed in advance of
a plant closing and a right to fair compensation (severance
pay). 59 Given our society's prevailing expectation of a "hands-
off" government and due to our tendency towards free mar-
ket capitalism, 60 any governmental regulation, such as plant
58. J. RAWLS, supra note 50, at 268.
59. The provisions proposed in this article are similar to those pro-
posed in the pastoral letter by the National Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops, Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy para. 292 (Second Draft
1985), reprinted in 15 ORIGINS 257 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Second
Draft].
The pastoral letter, however, goes farther than the legislation proposed
in this article, by suggesting that workers should have the right to ap-
proach management with possible alternatives. This provision has been in-
corporated into previously defeated plant closing legislation. See infra pp.
352-53. Opponents of plant closing legislation have heavily criticized this
specific provision claiming it would provide an unfair advantage to unions
and contradict labor precedent. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying
text. Opponents have also asserted that the provision would delay, and
sometimes effectively block, management actions. See Plant Closings and Re-
location and the Labor-Management Notification and Consultation Act of 1985,
Hearings on H.R. 1616 Before the Labor-Management Relations Subcomm. and
the Employment Opportunities Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-17 (1985) (statement of Mark de Bernado,
Manager of Labor Law for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) [hereinafter
cited as Chamber of Commerce Report].
60. Wogaman, supra note 31, at 100. Some assert, however, that
while laissez faire and the free market may be dominant in economic think-
ing, they are only "myths" in practice:
[The] enduring myth of the unmanaged market [has] sidetracked
Americans into endless debate over relative merits of two highly
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closing legislation, "must bear the burden of proof" for its
existence.61
It is uncontroverted that a proper function of govern-
ment is the protection of a person's right not to be unjustifi-
ably harmed.6 2 Serving in this protective function, the gov-
ernment may justifiably restore to the individual his negative
right,6" that is, his right not to be harmed, or devise means in
which to mitigate the harm caused and compensate the indi-
vidual for his lost right. When legislation is viewed as restor-
ing a negative right to the owner of such a right, the legisla-
tion is justified.
This is the case with the proposed plant closing legisla-
tion. The proposed legislation is limited to protecting the
worker's negative right not to be harmed through the corpo-
ration's use of its property. It does not attempt to give the
worker a new, positive right" that he did not previously pos-
sess. When viewed from this perspective, the legislation is jus-
tified. Additionally, it is justified as the only practical means
of protecting the worker and the community, given the lack
of viable alternatives.
artificial concepts: the "free market" and "national planning". Ei-
ther way, government will be actively involved. And though the
form of government intervention may be different, the fact of its
involvement will be nothing new ....
[Olur mythic assumptions lag behind our political reality. Every
major industry in America is deeply involved with and dependent
on government . . . . No sharp distinction can validly be drawn be-
tween private and public sectors within this or any other advanced in-
dustrialized country; the economic effects of public policies and cor-
porate decisions are completely interwined.
R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 232-33 (1983).
61. Wogaman, supra note 31, at 100.
62. Even laissez-faire theorists accept this minimal role of the gov-
ernment. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); L. VON MISES,
LIBERALISM, A Socto-ECONOMIC EXPOSITION 52 (1978) ("[A]s liberals see it,
the task of the state consists solely and exclusively in guaranteeing the pro-
tection of life, health, liberty and private property against violent
attacks.").
63. For a discussion of negative rights (i.e., negative liberty), see I.
BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 6-19 (1958) (Negative liberty is defined
as the absence of interference within a person's sphere of action). See also I.
BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 133-47 (1960); M. Rothbard, THE ETHICS
OF LIBERTY 215-28 (1983).
64. For positive rights discussion, see supra note 63; Block, Neglect of
the Market Place: The Questionable Economics of America's Bishops, 2 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 125, 142-50 (1986).
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A. Alternatives to National Legislation
1. Corporate and Union Voluntary Action
An obvious alternative to national legislation would be
responsible employer practices. According to the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce,"' voluntary corporate practices and pro-
grams aimed at mitigating the effects of plant closings on
workers and communities are growing in number and effec-
tiveness, as are government programs involving economic as-
sistance, retraining, and job replacement." Nonetheless, the
mere fact that the plant closing problem exists demonstrates
that employers are unwilling to unilaterally account for their
own action.
67
Critics of national plant closing legislation find an ade-
quate alternative in the marketplace, relying on the bargain-
ing process between the unions and the employer. Such op-
ponents of federal legislation are quick to assert that in a free
market, people can contract for virtually anything. They be-
lieve, however, that most workers are unwilling to make the
wage sacrifice necessary in order to "buy" fifty-two weeks of
severance pay. 8
To rely on the bargaining mechanism, however, is to
overlook a majority of the workers. In the United States,
union members comprise less than 25% of workers. Thus,
without some legislative standards, the large number of unor-
65. See Chamber of Commerce Report, supra note 59, at 2.
66. The National Center on Occupational Readjustment, Inc.
(NaCOR) has compiled a list of financial and technical assistance pro-
grams-both public and private-designed to ease and expedite the adjust-
ment process for displaced workers. See NATIONAL CENTER ON OCCUPA-
TIONAL READJUSTMENT, INC., MANAGING PLANT CLOSINGS AND OCCUPATIONAL
READJUSTMENT: AN EMPLOYER'S GUIDEBOOK (1984).
67. Some businesses do unilaterally account for their actions,
whether it be to avoid adverse effects on internal employee relations or
external public relations, or to be responsive to perceived social responsi-
bilities. American Hospital Supply (AHS) provides a useful model of a so-
cially responsive firm. In October 1979, AHS announced its intent to sell
its medical manufacturing company of about 275 employees. A meeting
was held of all employees to communicate the rationale for the decision. In
December 1979, another all-employee meeting was held and it was an-
nounced that the business would be gradually phased out. A retention/
outplacement program was prepared and explained in detail.
68. Critics assert that there are costs attached to any uniform re-
quirement and workers may not want to make the trade-off between sever-
ance pay and wages or other foregone fringe benefits. R. MCKENZIE, FUGI-
TIVE INDUSTRY: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF DEINDUSTRALIZATION 18
(1984).
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ganized workers can rely only on the largesse of employers. 9
To require these workers to negotiate individually with the
employer ignores the unequal bargaining power that exists
between the two parties. Disparity in expertise and alterna-
tive financial and employment options contribute to the im-
balanced bargaining positions. Workers are not as free as the
company. While it may be true that the workers freely chose
to take their jobs and that the workers knew or should have
known of the risks involved, workers must accept some job
just to stay alive. In many instances, their employment op-
tions are extremely limited. Moreover, if they can protect
their rights only through bargaining, workers, fearful of ap-
pearing to concede to an employer's decision to shut down,
may hesitate to bargain about termination rights.
Additionally, because an employer has almost packed his
bags at the time of disclosure of the decision to shut down, a
strike would not be effective, and thus even unions have little
power." Beginning in 1979, however, major unions have be-
come increasingly insistent on stronger provisions dealing
with closings.7 1 Nonetheless, a Bureau of Labor Statistics sur-
vey in 1984 indicated that only about 10% of collective bar-
gaining agreements contained advance notice provisions.7
Equally important, the community and other persons af-
fected by a plant shutdown would have no voice.7 ' The com-
munity's voicelessness is further exacerbated by the increas-
ing trend towards absentee ownership and control of
American business.7 4
69. Aaron, Plant Closings: American and Comparative Perspectives, 59
Cm. KENT L. REV. 941 (1983).
70. MacNeil, Plant Closings and Workers' Rights, 14 OTTAWA L. REV.
1, 17 (1982).
71. For example, in 1980, United Rubber Workers won from B.F.
Goodrich the right to prenotification and negotiations over any planned
shutdown, along with 24 months of medical and other insurance after a
shutdown.
72. Carroll, supra note 22, at 635.
73. Ford, supra note 13, at 1225.
74. A conglomerate lacking community loyalty and playing an
investment game with rules different from those that noncon-
glomerate companies have traditionally followed can simply write
off a line of business, a plant, a work force, or a whole community






Workers and unions have found little redress in the judi-
cial system. In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 75 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the employer, although re-
quired to bargain in good faith with the unions over the ef-
fects of managerial decisions, has no duty to bargain over the
decision itself."
In other cases, unions and communities have asserted a
moral property right theory, a moral claim to some control
over their workplaces, as the basis for a legal right to partici-
pate in the decision to close a plant. 7 John Locke was the
architect of this labor theory of property. According to this
theory, "property rights are acquired by 'mixing one's labor'
with, and thereby adding value to, external objects ....
[H]aving worked on an object and transformed it into a so-
cially valuable commodity gives one some claim to the fruits
of one's labor."'7 8 Using a form of this argument, workers
75. 452 U.S. 666 (1981), The National Labor Relation Board
(NLRB) was established by the National Labor Relation Act (NLRA),
which governs the process of collective bargaining in the United States. 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-165 (1982).
The decisions involving plant closings primarily focus on the alleged vio-
lation of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. R. MCKENZIE, supra note
68, at 125. Section 8(a)(3) prohibits employers from discriminating for pur-
poses of discouraging union membership, that is, to "act with antiunion
animus." Section 8(a)(5) requires an employer to bargain with a union over
conditions of employment. Where a duty to bargain about a particular mat-
ter is found, it is an unfair labor practice under this section for the em-
ployer to implement unilaterally a change respecting that matter. NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
76. We conclude that the harm likely to be done to an em-
ployer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to shutdown
part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the in-
cremental benefit that might be gained through the union's partic-
ipation in making the decision and we hold that the decision itself
is not part of. . . terms and conditions . . . over which Congress
has mandated bargaining.
452 U.S. at 686 (1981).
77. Lichtenberg, Workers, Owners, and Factory Closings, PHIL. & POL.,
Fall 1984, at 9.
78. Id. Locke's labor theory has, however, undergone much attack
on his "mixing metaphors" and the self-defeating result of the theory
when applied to the ownership of land. In applying Locke's labor theory to
the ownership of land, once all land is owned by some subset of the popula-
tion, those without ownership rights who must work on the land, are de-
nied the "fruits" of their labors by the results of the very arguments pro-
posed by Locke which were supposed to guarantee them. For a more
extensive treatment of Locke's labor theory, see L. BECKER, supra note 48,
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have attempted to claim a property interest in the plant. 9
Arguments that workers and communities could develop
property rights in jobs has received little support in the
courts. In Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel
Corp., 0 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
and said that it would not begin creating property rights on
its own accord. The court deferred policy formulation on
plant closing issues to legislative responsibility. 81 In sum, al-
at 36-56.
79. This theory of a property right was summarized in Local 1330,
United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir.
1980) by District Judge Lambros, and restated in the Court of Appeals
opinion:
Everything that has happened in the Mahoning Valley has been
happening for many years. Schools have been built, roads have
been built. Expansion that has taken place is because of steel. And
to accommodate that industry, lives and destinies of the inhabi-
tants of that community were based and planned on the basis of
that institution: steel.
II It seems to me that a property right has arisen from this lengthy,
long-established relationship between United States Steel, the steel
industry as an institution, the community in Youngstown, the peo-
ple in Mahoning County and the Mahoning Valley in having given
and devoted their lives to this industry. Perhaps not a property
right to the extent that can be remedied by compelling U.S. Steel
to remain in Youngstown. But I think the law can recognize the
property right to the extent that U.S. Steel cannot leave that Ma-
honing Valley and the Youngstown area in a state of waste, that it
cannot completely abandon its obligation to that community be-
cause certain vested rights have arisen out of this long relationship
and institution.
631 F.2d 1264, 1279-80 (1980).
80. 631 F.2d 1264 (1980). Local unions, a congressman, individual
steelworkers, and a coalition of steelworkers and clergy filed a suit against
the U.S. Steel Corporation seeking an order to keep the plants open or
requiring the corporation to sell the facilities to the union. In delivering
the lower court opinion, District Judge Lambros, after originally re-
straining the corporation from ceasing operations, entered a formal opin-
ion holding the plant had become unprofitable and denied all relief to the
plaintiffs. Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp.,
492 F. Supp. 1, 10 (N.D. Ohio 1980). The Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision allowing U.S. Steel to cease its operations. 631 F.2d
at 1282-83.
81. In dismissing the property claim, Judge Lambros commented:
This Court has spent many hours searching for a way to cut to the
heart of the economic reality-that obsolescence and market
forces demand the close of the Mahoning Valley plants, and yet
the lives of 3500 workers and their families and the supporting
Youngstown community cannot be dismissed as inconsequential.
United States Steel should not be permitted to leave the Youngs-
town area devastated after drawing from the lifeblood of the com-
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though some collective agreements have provided adequate
munity for so many years.
Unfortunately, the mechanism to reach this ideal settlement, to
recognize this new property right, is not now in existence in the
code of laws of our nation. At this moment, proposals for legisla-
tive redress of economic relocation like the situation before us are
pending on Capitol Hill . . . . However, this Court is not a legisla-
tive body and can not make laws where none exist-only those
remedies prescribed in the statutes or by virtue of precedent of
prior case law can be given cognizance. In these terms this Court
can determine no legal basis for the finding of a property right.
492 F. Supp. at 10.
Other emerging theories have been asserted by workers and/or commu-
nities opposed to plant closings:
(1) Breach of contract and promissory estoppel. In the U.S. Steel case
quoted above, employees also claimed breach of contract and promissory
estoppel with respect to the employer's alleged promises to keep the plant
open if employees made it profitable. The court denied the claims on the
grounds that (i) the alleged promises were made by one who lacked author-
ity, (ii) the statements were too vague to indicate a clear promise, and (iii)
the plants failed to become profitable.
In Abbington v. Dayton Malliable, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1290, 1298 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) the court held that employer statements intended to bolster
employee enthusiasm and congratulate employees for their efforts to keep
the plant operational did not constitute promises under the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. However, in Local 461, IUE v. Singer Co., 540 F.
Supp. 442 (D.N.J. 1982), the court enforced an employer's promise to in-
vest $2 million in modernizing its plant in exchange for certain employee
"give-backs." When the employer failed to perform the promised invest-
ment, the court ordered it to pay money damages to the employees in the
amount of the value of the "give-backs" or $2 million, whichever was
greater.
(2) Eminent Domain. Another theory being suggested is that a state or
municipality take over a failing plant without the owner's consent to keep
it open or prevent it from being moved. A non-industrial example of this
occurred recently when the city of Oakland, California attempted to con-
demn the Oakland Raiders National Football League franchise to prevent
its relocation in Los Angeles. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.
3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982). This case may induce
local governments to attempt to take over failing plants, particularly for
the purpose of reselling them to employees. See 32 Cal. 3d at 77 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
(3) Antitrust. Opponents to plant closings have attempted to claim anti-
trust violations in an owner's refusal to sell. In the U.S. Steel case, the presi-
dent of the company claimed he would not sell to a subsidized competitor.
631 F.2d at 1282. The Sixth Circuit, finding some merit in the plaintiffs
antitrust claim that U.S. Steel had exercised monopoly power for the pur-
pose of preventing a competitor from entering the steel market, remanded
the issue for further proceedings. No further proceedings were held on the
antitrust issue because the workers' buy-out effort by that time had col-
lapsed. The court revealed that its own research had produced no author-
ity under the antitrust laws supporting U.S. Steel's refusal to sell to a subsi-
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security for employees, so long as (i) three-fourths of the
workers remain unorganized and thereby stand in unequal
footing to bargain with the employer, and (ii) courts continue
to deny workers the right to participate in a shutdown deci-
sion, the enactment of some minimum legislation to protect
the workers' interests is justified.
3. Federal Assistance
Another alternative proposed in lieu of national legisla-
tion governing plant closings is the development of a federal
social welfare system8 2 or of community contingency funds83
to cushion workers in the event of a plant closing. Either of
these alternatives would spread the cost of the shutdown and
dilute the burden on the displaced workers. Both alterna-
tives, however, encourage a total lack of corporate accounta-
bility. They provide corporations with no incentive to ex-
amine alternatives to a closing. More importantly, welfare
does not force the business to internalize its social costs.
When a plant closes, it is the management's decision; there-
fore, the management should be held accountable for the
consequences of its actions.84
Congressional response to dislocation caused by changes
in governmental economic policy may serve as a model for
the principle that those whose policy and planning are the
cause of economic disruption have a duty to help affected
workers adjust to a new economic order.85 Through trade
policies, the federal government can affect the viability of
certain industries. For example, lower tariffs plague many
sectors which were once protected in their domestic markets
with competition, often causing displacement of workers.
Since reduction of tariffs is viewed as beneficial to the entire
economy, the displacement caused by lower trade tariffs is
not borne by the workers alone.86 The U.S. Trade Act of
197487 provides Trade Adjustment Assistance to these
workers.88
dized competitor. Id.
82. MacNeil, supra note 70, at 2.
83. R. McKENZIE, supra note 68, at 97.
84. MacNeil, supra note 70, at 51.
85. Id. at 50.
86. Id.
87. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2251 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985).
88. To be eligible for trade adjustment assistance, the Department
of Labor must find: (i) that a significant number or proportion of the work-
ers in the facility have become or are threatened to become displaced, (ii)
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Plant closings differ from trade adjustment in that the
employer rather than the government pays the benefits. In
both situations, however, the one that caused the disruption
pays. 89 When the government reduces tariffs causing worker
displacement, the government pays because lower tariffs ben-
efit the country as a whole and equitably spread the losses
incurred. Similarly, when a company decides that closing a
plant benefits the company as a whole, it should also ensure
that the losses are equitably spread and not permit them to
fall primarily on the employees. Just as legislation could pre-
vent domestic losses by continuing a high tariff policy, it
could also limit the losses suffered by employees by restrict-
ing the company's right to close down. That, however, may
not produce the overall best result for the economy since it
costs a business less to assist employees than it costs the gov-
ernment to prevent the change. 0
4. State Legislation
Many states have introduced some form of plant closing
legislation. A mere five states have enacted legislation: Maine,
Wisconsin, South Carolina, Connecticut, and Massachusetts."
Although state plant closing legislation is constitutional, 2 it
provides an insufficient remedy for those affected by a plant
shutdown.
Maine's legislation" requires any employer of more than
100 persons that proposes to close or relocate outside of the
state, to notify employees sixty days in advance of such
planned action. Failure to notify results in a maximum fine of
$500. In addition to this notice, the employer is required to
pay the affected workers a lump sum equal to one week's pay
for each year of service. This severance provision does not
that the company's sales or production have decreased absolutely; and (iii)
that the increases of imports competitive with the company's produce
"contributed importantly" to the displacements (or threats thereof) and to
the decline in sales or production. Id. § 2272 (1980).
89. MacNeil, supra note 70, at 51.
90. Id.
91. Additionally, two cities have enacted some form of plant closing
ordinances: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Vacaville, California.
92. State plant closing laws raise federal preemption, commerce
clause, and contract clause issues. For a constitutional analysis of state legis-
lation, see Comment, The Constitutional Aspects of Restricting Business Clo-
sures, 14 PAC. L.J. 275 (1983). See also Note, A Legal, Economic, and Norma-
tive Analysis of National Plant Closing Legislation, 11 J. LEGis. 348 (1984).
93. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625B (Supp. 1985).
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apply when: (i) relocation or termination of an establishment
is necessitated by a physical calamity; (ii) the affected worker
takes a job at the relocated site; or (iii) the affected worker
has been employed at the establishment for less than three
years.
The Wisconsin legislation94 requires every employer in
the state employing 100 or more persons to give sixty days
notice prior to closings, mergers, or relocations. The penalty
imposed for violation of this notice requirement is a maxi-
mum fine of $50 for each terminated employee.
In South Carolina, the statute regulating plant closings95
applies only to those employers who require an employee to
give notice before quitting a job. These employers must no-
tify employees of a plant shutdown at least two weeks in ad-
vance or provide the same advance notification they demand
from their employees. Shutdowns or temporary cessations of
work due to machinery breakdowns or to some act of God or
the public enemy are exempted from these provisions.
The Connecticut plant closing statute 6 requires employ-
ers of 100 or more persons who close or relocate their estab-
lishments to continue to pay existing group health insurance
for each affected employee and dependents for up to ninety
days. Massachusetts enacted a new plant closing law97 that en-
courages, but does not require, employers to give ninety days
advance notice of closings and to provide severance packages
to protect workers affected by the closings. Although compli-
ance is voluntary, the law provides that employers financed,
insured or subsidized by quasi-public state agencies "shall
agree to accept" the voluntary "social compact."98
On close examination, these statutes are only minimally
effective. The nominal fines imposed by the Maine and Wis-
consin statutes have little deterrent effect. Although the fines
imposed by the South Carolina statute are somewhat steeper,
they are hardly severe. The notice requirements, especially
the sixty days required by Maine and Wisconsin, enable state
authorities and unions to pressure employers to discuss their
plans and possibly to modify or even abandon them. In South
Carolina, however, the notice requirement is much shorter,
94. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West 1976).
95. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1981).
96. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-510 (West Supp. 1985).





and in any case, an employer can easily bring himself outside
the scope of the statute by not requiring employees to give
notice of their intentions to quit. 9
Moreover, despite any limited statutory protection af-
forded the worker and community, such statutes, when en-
acted randomly among the states, provide a competitive ad-
vantage to those states not enacting such legislation.'" 0
Consequently, states seeking to attract new firms or industries
are unlikely to enact plant closing legislation, even if
needed."' Legislation enacted on a national level would elim-
inate such disincentives. A national plant closing bill would
establish minimum, uniform standards to govern plant shut-
downs throughout the country, thereby eliminating any re-
gional competitive advantage.
Critics of national legislation assert that such legislation
would place the United States at a disadvantage in the world
market.0 2 Supporters of this legislation, however, are quick
to point to other industrialized countries, such as West Ger-
many, Sweden, Great Britain, Canada, France, and the
Netherlands, which have already enacted such legislation. As
a member of West Germany's largest trade union stated: "We
haven't repealed the laws of capitalism. The market forces
causing many plant closings are fundamentally irresistible.
When you have to jump out of a burning building, however,
it is better to land in a fireman's net."103
Although these other European countries may not have
moved any farther than the United States to "put out the
fire," they have certainly constructed a much better safety
net.10 4 Indeed, as far back as 1966, it was recognized that
"[t]he United States is the only industrialized country that
permits the closings of large plants without notice."105
99. Aaron, supra note 69, at 950.
100. R. MCKENZIE, supra note 68, at 89.
101. Millspaugh, The Campaign for Plant Closing Laws in the United
States: An Assessment, 5 CORP. LREv. 291, 303 (1982). The situation where
some states enact plant closing legislation and some do not is analagous to
the case of the "prisoner's dilemma." See J. RAWLS, supra note 50, at 269-
70.
102. Millspaugh, supra note 101 passim.
103. JOINT REPORT OF LABOR UNION STUDY TOUR PARTICIPANTS, Eco-
NOMIC DISIPATION: PLANT CLOSINGS, PLANT RELOCATIONS AND PLANT CON-
VERSIONS 22 (1979) [hereinafter cited as JOINT REPORT].
104. Id.
105. Report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and
Economic Progress, 1 TECH. & AMER. ECON. 67 (1966), cited in Aaron, supra
note 69, at 966.
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Reference to the European model may frighten rather
than convince American employers of the necessity of federal
plant closing legislation. The proposed legislation acknowl-
edges that the European legislation is the product of eco-
nomic, social, and political cultures profoundly different from
our own. 10 Indeed, what Works in those countries need not,
and probably cannot, work in the United States. °10 Nonethe-
less, it remains that private businesses in Western Europe, in-
cluding subsidiaries and affiliates of many American firms
which have invested heavily over the last thirty years, have
found that they can survive and indeed profit while operating
under such laws.'08 In view of the inadequate alternatives
that have been proposed, government intervention via na-
tional legislation is necessary.
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. Previous Legislation
National legislative remedies governing plant closing
have been vigorously pursued in Congress since 1979. The
centerpiece of this legislative movement was the National
Employment Priorities Act of 1979.109 Features of this bill
were also incorporated into other proposed remedies: the
Employee and Community Stabilization Act of 1979,1 the
Employment Maintenance Act of 1980,"' the Corporate De-
mocracy (or Governance) Act of 1980,112 the National Em-
106. Aaron, supra note 69, at 964.
107. The following practices and policies are unlikely to work in the
United States: (i) selectively nationalizing "key industries"; (ii) requiring
employers to negotiate the decision to close a plant with workers and com-
munity representatives, a requirement currently in force in West Germany;
(iii) providing federal funds for public enterprises that can replace closed
private companies as practiced in Sweden; and (iv) requiring firms to have
their investment and disinvestment plans submitted to some government
board for approval, as required in West Germany. R. McKENZIE, supra note
68, at 13.
108. Joint Report, supra note 103, at 4.
109. H.R. 5040, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1608, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). '[his bill was first introduced into the Senate by then Sena-
tor Walter Mondale (D-Minn.) and now is sponsored by Senator Donald
Riegle (D-Mich.). In the House, the chief supporter is Representative Wil-
liam Ford (D-Mich.)
I10.. S. 1609, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (introduced by former
Senator Harrison Williams (D-N.J.)).
111. S. 2400, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980) (introduced by Senator
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)).
112. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980) (introduced by Benja-
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ployment Priorities Act of 1983,113 and most recently, the
Labor-Management Notification and Consultation Act of
1985.114 Although these legislative efforts have been
thwarted, the number of co-sponsors for this legislation has
increased in successive terms of Congress. Bills have emerged
from committees where they were once buried, and more
proposals are under serious consideration. Although limited,
these gradual successes indicate a relentless movement to-
ward the eventual enactment of some form of plant closing
legislation.
The critics continually contend that any legislation is ec-
onomically inefficient. Economists, such as Richard McKen-
zie," 5 have specifically criticized plant closing legislation as a
dangerous infringement upon capital mobility that will ham-
per the efficiency of the market. They assert that keeping
inefficient and uncompetitive plants open will only intensify
and delay the need for restructuring the economy.' Legisla-
tion would force a company to produce inefficiently, resulting
in higher prices for the consumer in the short run and loss of
sales and solvency in the long run."'7 Moreover, these econo-
mists argue that penalizing firms for reallocating investment
in the most efficient way will not only penalize the ultimate
consumer, but also will reduce the ability of the market to
create economic opportunities for workers in the future.'
The proposed legislation recognizes the validity of this
economic argument. If enacted, it would not prohibit a com-
pany from closing nor would it restrict the ability of a busi-
ness to disinvest; it would only require notice and severance
pay. It does not increase either worker or government partic-
ipation in the fundamental business decision-making.
min Rosenthal (D-N.Y.)).
113. F.R. 2847, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 129 Cong. Rec. H2528
(1983).
114. H.R. 1616, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Repre-
sentatives William D. Ford (D-Mich.), Silvio Conte (R-Mass.), and William
Clay (D-Mo.)).
115. Richard B. McKenzie, currently Professor of Economics at
Clemson University and Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, is the
author and editor of numerous books, including Plant Closings: Public or
Private Choices (1982) and Restrictions on Business Mobility: A Study in Political
Rhetoric and Economic Reality (1979).
116. R. McKENZIE, supra note 68, at 83-108.
117. Chamber of Commerce Report, supra note 59, at 12.
118. A. Aboud & S. Schram, An Overview of Plant Closing Legislation
and Issues, in KEY ISSUES: PLANT CLOSING LEGISLATION 40 (A. Aboud ed.
1984).
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Opponents have also criticized previous plant closing
bills for being drafted without adequate employer input.
They contend that these remedies are "one-sided and appear
somewhat adversarial . . . .[T]hey work to right an array of
perceived worker disenfranchisements and to neutralize the
arbitrary, insensitive, powerful employer. The flow of stan-
dards, liability and penalties is clearly one directional. This
imbalance is most pronounced."'1 9 Legislation that requires
only notice and severance pay works a fair compromise be-
tween the workers' rights and the economic well-being of the
employer. It does not require the employer to act "beyond
the call of duty"; it demands only that he internalize all costs
related to the operation of his business-and such costs in-
clude those of closing or relocating a plant.
B. Proposed Legislation
The proposed legislation would apply to any industry or
commercial facility which employs 100 or more persons and
has operated in its present location (or within 100 miles) for
three years. It contains two major provisions: (i) advance no-
tice, and (ii) severance pay. These provisions only apply to a
business that has operated in its location for at least three
years because such a business has established its presence in
the community, and thus, has incurred greater obligations.
1. Notification
Prenotification requires the employer to notify the work-
ers and community in advance of a planned shutdown or re-
location. The proposed notice requirement provides that if
20% of the employees of a "covered establishment" suffer
job loss as a result of a transfer or closure, the employer must
furnish written notice to the Secretary of Labor, the local
government, and the affected workers. Such notice must be
not less than six months in advance of the closing or transfer
if the number of employees to suffer an employment loss is
less than 150, and not less than one year if the number of
affected employees is over 150. Additionally, the proposed
legislation provides an "escape clause" to employers who
would be unable to provide the full required notice. This
provision exempts those situations where because of "una-
voidable business circumstances," the full six or twelve
month notice would obviously be impossible or




This notice provision serves several purposes. First, it al-
lows workers and the community an opportunity to prepare
for and adjust to a plant closing both emotionally and finan-
cially. Workers can begin to look or train for a new job with
the same employer in the same plant or at another location.
Studies indicate that an employee's chance of reemployment
is greater while he carries the "employed" label. 2 ' Second,
requiring a company to prenotify may spur that company to
reexamine the larger effects of a closing and perhaps recon-
sider the disinvestment. Finally, advance notice affords the
government, community, workers, and union, if involved, the
opportunity to evaluate other alternatives. If the plant is clos-
ing due to market conditions, for example, advance notice al-
lows the community and workers sufficient time to consider
rescuing the existing operation'2 " by developing a plan for a
community 23 or a worker buyout, 24 attracting a new busi-
120. Although many businessmen assert that plant closings result
from business failures and are unavoidable, research undertaken by Profes-
sor Charles Craypo of Cornell University (now at the University of Notre
Dame) showed otherwise. Craypo studied 27 facility closings between 1954
and 1983 in the Indiana factory towns of South Bend and Mishawaka.
These closings resulted in the loss of nearly 40,000 jobs. In 24 of the 27
cases Craypo studied, business failures or bankruptcy were not a factor in
their shutdown. According to Craypo, the key determinant in the inci-
dence of closings and phasedowns was whether absentee owners continued
to invest in local plants. Absentee owners closed 23 of the 27 plants, 19 of
the plants were relocated elsewhere, and some of the plants were closed for
anticompetitive reasons. Locally owned, healthy businesses were acquired
by multiplant, absentee owners which closed them in order to concentrate
available market share among fewer producers. C. CRAYPO, COOPERATION
AMONG LABOR, MANAGEMENT, AND THE COMMUNITY EXPERIENCES FROM THE
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF A FACTORY TOWN, SOUTH BEND, INDIANA, 1954-1983
(1984).
121. Carroll, supra note 22, at 133.
122. In the case of Chrysler, the federal government provided fed-
eral loans which enabled Chrysler to continue operations. See B. BLUESTONE
& B. HARRISON, supra note 12, at 74.
123. It has been argued that the first obligation of a company to its
employees and the community is to attempt to sell the business as a going
concern instead of shutting down. Although this may not always be possi-
ble, it should be explored. Quite often, a company may find the most
promising new buyers of a firm to be residents of the state who possess a
long-term stake in the community and are willing to make a strong com-
mitment. Carroll, supra note 22, at 131.
124. The National Center for Employee Ownership estimates some
50,000 workers have saved their jobs by taking over companies. In 1983,
employees purchased a West Virginia steel mill. The mill, now called Na-
tional Steel's Weirton mill, is the nation's largest employee-owned enter-
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ness to the facility site, or finding a new owner.
Prenotification provides unions not only the time to facil-
itate the adjustment process, but also the chance to attempt
to reverse the decision of the management."' Opponents of
prenotification (primarily business) assert, however, that ad-
vance notice provides only a marginal benefit to unions and
would serve to distort the bargaining process. Such criticism
lacks merit. Rather than distorting the bargaining process,
such information rationalizes the process-each party under-
stands the goals and limitations of the other. It only becomes
distorted when one party has information that the other does
not, especially information that would significantly affect the
negotiation.
1 20
Critics also argue that the notice period would produce
problems of workforce morale, worker defection, and a de-
cline in business activity. The latter would be due to the re-
luctance of financial institutions to grant credit to a corpora-
tion that plans to shut down, and the potential loss of
customers who would go elsewhere for business. The pro-
posed legislation responds to the problem of maintaining a
satisfactory workforce by providing that workers who defect
from their place of employment prior to the termination of
the notice period forego severance pay."2 ' Given the speed of
economic events, no doubt an employer planning a closure
will experience a decline in business activity during the notice
period. Nonetheless, because it is the employer's action of
closing the plant that is the proximate cause of credit
problems and customer defection, the employer justly should
have to bear the cost.
The prenotification requirement is neither worker biased
nor pro-employer. On the contrary, it presents an even-
handed and just compromise between the affected parties.
prise as well as its eighth largest producer of steel. Although workers had
to take about a 32 percent cut in pay, "32 percent less of $25 an hour is a
whole lot better than 100 percent of nothing." A Steel Town's Fight for Life,
NEWSWEEK, March 28, 1983, at 49; Carroll, supra note 22, at 131-32.
The legislation proposed by this article assumes that the initiative for
considering such alternatives, i.e., community and/or worker buyout, gov-
ernment assistance, is not the burden of the company planning to close,
but is the burden of the worker, community, and/or government. The
company need only to provide advance notice and severance payment to
perform its legal duty under this proposed legislation.
125. MacNeil, supra note 70, at 41.
126. Id. at 24.
127. This provision follows closely similar legislation currently en-
forced in Great Britain. Id. at 42-43.
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The prenotification requirement is not transformed to oper-
ate as a penalty to the corporation and does not act as a trig-
ger device to a governmental intervention process, as pro-
posed under recently introduced bills. "8 The decision to
close remains within the management's discretion.
2 9
2. Severance Pay
In addition to prenotification, the proposed legislation
requires employers to make severance payments to employees
and the community or local government, and continue health
and welfare benefits. Under this provision, any business that
relocates 100 or more miles from its original location or ter-
minates business shall be liable to the employees for sever-
ance pay at a rate of two months pay for each year of employ-
ment in that business. The employer is excused from the
severance payment liability if the following conditions exist:
(i) the employee quits before the notice period terminates; (ii)
the employee has been employed by the business for less than
three years; (iii) the employee accepts employment at the new
location; or (iv) the termination or relocation of the business
is necessitated by an act of God or by a public enemy.
Although severance pay falls short of guaranteeing job
security, it does compensate the workers for lost negative
rights when a plant closes. It is not just an income mainte-
nance technique; the losses incurred by the
worker-increasing with seniority of the employee-are
measured by the number of years worked. Thus in the case
of a successor employer who provides the employees with the
same seniority and benefits, this legislation clearly relieves
the initial employer of the obligation.
Additionally, severance payments may act as a market
motivator. If the introduction of change into the workplace
will result in job losses, one can expect the workers to resist
vigorously these changes. But if society is to maintain reason-
able standards of living, sufficient rates of production, and ec-
onomic well-being, industries must continue to adapt to the
environment to remain competitive and rid themselves of ob-
solete equipment; severance payments induce workers' coop-
eration.'30 Moreover, severance pay may promote labor mo-
bility by enabling workers to invest in job searching,
128. Such bills include H.R. 2847 and H.R. 1616. See supra notes
113-14.
129. See Millspaugh, supra note 101 passim.
130. MacNeil, supra note 70, at 33.
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retraining, or relocation, while enticing workers to remain at
the job until the end of the notice period. Severance pay
serves, at worst, as a disincentive to a worker to look for
work, and at best as a means of internalizing the true costs of
a shutdown into the decision-making process.
Finally, the legislation requires the business to compen-
sate the community for its losses incurred. A company that
transfers or terminates its operations must pay the local com-
munity or government agency to which it was liable for taxes
an amount equal to 85% of one year's tax revenues lost as the
result of the company's actions. When a plant has operated in
a community for more than three years, the company has in-
curred an obligation to the community, much in the same
sense as it has to its employees. A quid pro quo relationship is
present: The community has relied on this company for jobs
and taxes, while the company has relied on the community
for services. As the worker had an invested interest in the
company, so does the community.
CONCLUSION
The proposed national legislation governing plant clos-
ings does not prohibit plant closures, nor does it take the de-
cision of whether to close or not from the hands of manage-
ment. It simply requires that a company account for all the
costs of its operations-both intentional and unintentional. It
requires that a business, prior to a shutdown, provide ad-
vance notice and severance pay to the affected workers and
communities.
Shareholders, as legal owners of the corporation, in the-
ory are free to dictate the use of their property. This owner-
ship right, however, is not absolute; it is subject to the legiti-
mate claims of others. The proposed legislation protects the
claims of the affected workers and communities and prevents
corporations from shielding themselves from their responsi-
bilities through absolute ownership rights.
Government intervention in the private business sector is
not without precedent. Through the enactment of national
legislation, not only are the effects of a plant shutdown on
the workers and communities mitigated, but the socially en-
lightened companies are enabled to take socially desirable ac-
tions without incurring serious competitive disadvantages.
Moreover, the indifferent or maleficent corporations are
forced to adhere to some minimum requirement of corporate
responsibility.
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